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the owner of the shipment can establish that damage occurred in the United
States.3 2
DIVERSITY JURISDICTION UNDER SECTION 303 (b) OF THE
TAFT-HARTLEY ACT-
DURING the fifteen-odd years prior to the Taft-Hartley Act,' secondary
boycotts and jurisdictional strikes were virtually unrestrained by federal2 or
state law.3  The new act has changed the picture. Section 8(b) classifies
32. Section 6-204 of the New Commercial Code (May, 1949 Draft) makes the fol-
lowing provision:
"The issuer of a through bill of lading or other document embodying an undertaking
to be performed in part by connecting carriers or other persons is liable to anyone en-
titled to recover on the document for any breach by a connecting carrier or other person
of its obligation under the document."
The scope of this section is in doubt. However, even if limited to bills issued in the
United States, it would seem to cover the Reider situation (new bill issued at port of
entry) and all exports originating in the United States. It should be noted that in out-
lining the applicability of the Code, Section 1-105 provides that if used as a federal
statute "This Act shall apply whenever any contract or transaction within its terms...
(a) Is in or affects interstate or foreign commerce; . . :
* Schatte v. International Alliance, 84 F. Supp. 669 (S.D. Cal. 1949).
1. 61 STAT. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 141 (Supp. 1948). For general treatments of the
Act, see Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 HAnv.
L. REv. 1, 274 (1947-8); Daykin, Collective Bargaining and the Taft-Hartley Act, 33
IowA L. REv. 623 (1948) ; Perkins, Basic Labor Law Issues Under the Taft-Hartley Act,
27 B.U.L. REv. 370 (1947).
2. Under the Wagner Act, secondary boycotts and jurisdictional strikes were not
prohibited; the only defined unfair labor practices were those of employers. 49 STAT.
449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1946). The Norris-LaGuardia Act gave positive protec-
tion to these particular union activities by divesting the federal courts of jurisdiction to
enjoin them. 47 STAT. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 101 (1946) ; United States v. Hutcheson,
312 U.S. 219 (1941) (jurisdictional strike picketing and "don't purchase" letters);
Taxi-Cab Drivers Local v. Yellow Cab Operating Co., 123 F.2d 262 (10th Cir. 1941)
(secondary boycotts). See Note, 21 Tmsp. L.Q. 258 (1948).
3. State labor laws have generally paralleled the federal law. Thus, anti-injunction
acts similar to the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 STAT. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 101 (1946),
have been adopted in 18 of the principle industrial states. See Comment, Current Legis-
lative and Judicial Restrictions on State Labor Injunction Acts, 53 YALE UJ. 553 (1944).
See also, Crothers, Tie Anti-Inijunction Acts and Our State Conslitutions, 21 Orz L.
REv. 63 (1941). And in 10 states, "Little Wagner Acts" specifically include these activ-
ities within the concept of a labor dispute. See Dodd, Some State Legislator: Go to
War--on Labor Unions, 29 IowA L. REV. 148 (1944); Killingsworth, Restrictive State
Labor Relations Acts, [1947] Wis. L. REv. 546.
Although 12 states now have laws prohibiting secondary boycotts and 10 states now
bar jurisdictional strikes, most of these restrictions have been passed since 1947. For a
complete compilation of these statutes see Millis & Katz, A Decade of State Labor Legis-
laton 1937-47, 15 U. oF CHL L. REv. 282, 300-1, 304-5 (1948).
A few states do permit limited common law actions against boycotts and jurisdic-
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secondary boycotts and jurisdictional strikes as unfair labor practices,4 and
Section 303(b) gives injured parties a private right of action for damages,
enforceable in federal or state courtsY But the availability of the federal
forum for 303 (b) actions has recently been severely limited by Schatto v. In-
ternational Alliance,6 which requires diversity of citizenship for federal court
jurisdiction.
A protracted jurisdictional dispute had culminated in an arbitration award-
ing the disputed work to one of the two contending unions. After some ef-
fort to secure a reversal of the award, the losing union brought the issue to a
federal court in an action for damages under Section 303(b).7 Unlike Sec-
tional strikes. See, Gershon, Free Speech and the Secondary Boycott-A Reconsidera-
tion, 21 So. CALIF. L. REv. 76 (1947) ; Gromfine, Labor's Use of Secondary Boycotts, 15
GEo. WAsH. L. Rzv. 327 (1947).
4. The prohibited activities are defined in Section 8(b) (4), which makes it an lin-
fair labor practice for a union to engage in or encourage a strike or a boycott where Its
object is any one of the following:
(1) forcing any employer, other than its own to recognize or bargain with a iion-
certified union;
(2) forcing its own or any other employer to (a) join an employer organization or
a union, (b) cease dealing with the products of, or doing business with, any person, (c)
recognize or bargain with a labor organization in disregard of the previous certification
of another union, (d) assign particular work to a particular union unless a Board order
or certification is being violated.
Section 10(1) makes it mandatory that the Board seek an injunction where Section
8(b) (4) is violated. Major reliance, however, seems to have been placed on the de-
terrent effect of the new private remedy. 93 CONG. REc. 4858 (1947).
See, generally, Gromfine, Labor's Use of Secondary Boycotts, 15 GEo. WAsir. L. REV.
327 (1947); Janes, Secondary Boycotts and the Taft-Hartley Law, 8 LAw. GUILD REv.
371 (1948).
5. "Whoever shall be injured in his business or property by reason of any violation
of [Section 303(a)] may sue therefor in any district court of the United States subject
to the limitations and provisions of Section 301 hereof without respect to the amount in
controversy or in any other court having jurisdiction of the parties, and shall recover
the damages by him sustained and the cost of the suit." 61 STAT. 159 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§ 187 (Supp. 1948). Section 303(a) defines the prohibited practices in the same terms
as Section 8(b) (4).
6. 84 F. Supp. 669 (S.D. Cal. 1949).
7. The pleadings presented a confused picture. A series of controversies over the
erection of sets for Hollywood stages resulted in certain work being alternately allocated
between Carpenters (plaintiffs' union) and International Alliance (the defendant union).
In October 1945, the Carpenters struck, ostensibly against the defendant-employer, but
actually against Alliance. Pursuant to a subsequent agreement, the Executive Council of
the A. F. of L. investigated the dispute and allotted the major portion of the work to
Alliance. Carpenters then got the president of the A. F. of L. to interpret the allocation
decision so as to reallocate the disputed work to them. The Studios and Alliance re-
fused to recognize this "interpretation" and Carpenters went out on strike. The Car-
penters then instituted a suit in a district court alleging these facts as a violation of
Section 303. They claimed injury to their "business and property" and "great distress to
body and mind" shown by the fact that they had been out of work for 39 weeks. Brief
for Defendant on Motion to Dismiss, pp. 12-19, Schatte v. International Alliance, 84 F.
Supp. 669 (S.D. Cal. 1949) ; Opening Brief for Appellants, pp. 46-51 (on appeal).
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tion 301, which creates a similar damage action, for breach of collective bar-
gaining agreements, Section 303 does not expressly exclude diversity as a
jurisdictional requirement 8  Contrasting the two sections, the court con-
cluded that the lack of a disclaimer in 303(b) signified congressional intent
to require diversity, despite a clause subjecting 303 to the limitations and pro-
visions of 301.9 Since the parties were not diverse, the case was dismissed
for want of jurisdiction.' 0
While Congress may require diversity for enforcement of an action in the
federal courts if it so chooses," the requirement is not necessary to federal
jurisdiction whenever an action presents a "federal question."' 2 A party
automatically invokes "federal question" jurisdiction by asserting a federally
created right in his complaint.13 Since the Schatte plaintiff relied on a federal
8. "Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization
representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this Act, or be-
tween any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court in the United
States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or
without regard to the citizenship of the parties." 61 STAT. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185
(Supp. 1948).
9. Schatte v. International Alliance, 84 F. Supp. 669, 674 (S.D. Cal. 1949).
10. 84 F. Supp. 669, 674 (S.D. Cal. 1949). Plaintiffs relied also on the theory that
defendants' activity constituted a conspiracy to deprive plaintiffs of the right to work in
violation of the Civil Rights Act, 14 STAT. 27 (1866), 8 U.S.C. § 41 (1946), and the
Constitution, U.S. CosrT. AnamN. V, XMX. These claims had been rejected in a prior
case involving the same parties, and the Schatte court applied the customary rule of res
judicata. 84 F. Supp. 669, 671. A further claim that plaintiffs' collective bargaining agree-
ment had been breached within the damage provision of Section 301, see note 8 infra,
was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because suit was not brought in the Union's name.
84 F. Supp. 669, 672.
11. U.S. Coxsr. Art. HI, § 2. Under this power, Congress has given general di-
versity jurisdiction to the federal courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (Supp. 1949). See, generally,
I MooRE's FEDER.L PRACrICE 470-2, 480-99 (1938).
12. "Federal question" is itself but one of several alternative grounds for federal
court jurisdiction. The judicial power, U.S. CoNsT., Art. HI, § 2 extends to (1) all
cases arising under the Constitution, laws and treaties of the United States ("federal
question"), (2) all cases affecting Ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, (3)
all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, (4) controversies to which the United
States is a party, (5) controversies between two or more states, (6) all cases between a
state and citizens of another state, (7) all cases between citizens of different states, (8)
all cases between citizens of the same state claiming lands under grants of different states
and between a state or citizens thereof, and foreign states, citizens or subjects.
These are the limits beyond which Congress cannot go in vesting jurisdiction in the
federal courts. Most of the constitutional grants have been carried over into statutes.
28 U.S.C., c. 85 (Supp. 1949). See I CYCLOPEDIA OF FEDmRAL ProcEmuR 107 (2d ed. 1943).
13. E.g., Tennessee v. Union & Planters' Bank, 152 U.S. 454 (1894). Congress may
constitutionally confer federal question jurisdiction whenever it has the power to regulate
the subject matter concerned. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 9 Wheat. 738 (U.S.
1824). See Mooazis JUDmCAL CODE COMMENTARY 135-52 (1949). Occasionally, Congress
is vague and courts have to determine whether it actually intended to confer jurisdiction.
See, e.g., Galy v. First National Bank, 299 U.S. 109 (1036). See generally Forrester,
The Nature of a "Federal Question". 16 TULA,= L. REv. 362 C1942).
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right created by Section 303(b), 14 the court should have accepted jurisdic-
tion unless there was a clear congressional intent to require the additional
element of diversity.15
It is extremely doubtful that Congress exhibited, as the court found,10 any
such intent by omitting in Section 303(b) the express exclusion of diversity
found in Section 301. The latter clause was designed to meet a specific
problem not present in drafting Section 303(b). Federal courts had uni-
formly held that diversity was required for federal jurisdiction over a com-
mon law action to enforce a collective bargaining agreement. 1T This back-
ground presented two dangers. First, courts might tend to hold that Con-
gress could not convert a common law action into a right involving a valid
federal question, and that diversity would still be necessary. A minority of
congressmen actually held this view."' But it seemed clear to the others that
congressional power over employer-employee relations included the creation
of federal remedies for injuries arising from the prohibited activities.1 , An
express statement that diversity was unnecessary was calculated to make the
majority's sentiment perfectly clear. The second danger was that courts
would recognize a federal question but retain a diversity requirement on the
ground that Congress, though "aware" of past judicial interpretations, had
14. The section does not raise a question of constitutional power, see note 13 sopra,
since it is clear that Congress may validly legislate concerning employer-employee rela-
tions in interstate commerce. National Labor Relation Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). And see note 19 infra. Congress itself has answered the
question of whether the district court has jurisdiction by making a specific and definite
grant. See note 5 supra. Therefore, if a plaintiff can bring himself within the terms of
Section 303(b), the district court has jurisdiction whether his claim ultimately be held
good or bad. Cf. Binderup v. Pathe Exchange, 263 U.S. 291 (1923).
15. See MooRe's JUDICIAL CODE COMMENTARY 140-46 (1949). See notes 12 and 13
supra.
16. 84 F. Supp. 669, 673 (S.D. Cal. 1949).
17. E.g., Blankenship v. Kurkman, 96 F.2d 450 (7th Cir. 1938). This case deter-
mined that Congress had not yet created any contractual rights under the Wagner Act
for employees and their employers. An action relying on the Act did not therefore state
a federal question and diversity was necessary in order for the case to be heard in a
federal court. See notes 12 and 13 supra.
18. Minority reports in both the House and Senate attacked the constitutionality of
Section 301 because of its express disclaimer of diversity, see note 8 supra. It was
argued that the section was merely procedural-that it attempted to transfer ordinary
breach of contract suits to the federal courts without creating a federal substantive right
and therefore diversity was required. See H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 109
(1947) (Minority Report); SEr. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1947)
(Minority Report). See also Hearings before Committee on Labor and Public Welfare
on S.5 and S.J. Res. 22, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 57 (1947) (Senator Pepper and former
Secretary of Labor Schwellenbach).
19. Id. at 58; Note, Section 301(A) of the Taft-Hartley Act: A Constitutionar
Problem of Federal Jurisdiction, 57 YALE L.J. 630 (1948). The constitutionality of the
section was upheld in Colonial Hardwood Flooring Co. v. International Union, 76 F.
Supp. 493 (D. Md. 1948).
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refused to change them. The express disclaimer eliminated any possibility
of such statutory misinterpretation.
In drafting Section 303(b), on the other hand, Congress had no problem of
overcoming prior judicial interpretation. Since the Wagner and Norris-La-
Guardia Acts in effect gave positive protection to secondary boycotts and
jurisdictional strikes,20 the federal courts had had no occasion to pass on
jurisdictional requirements.
Moreover, the drafters of the act thought an express disclaimer of diversity
unnecessary to Section 303(b) .21 Senator Taft, in defending the section,
compared it to the treble damage clause of the Sherman Act2 on which it had
been patterned.2 Since the courts had never required diversity there,-4 he
seemed to assume that Section 303 (b) would be similarly unrestricted.P Even
those Senators who challenged the wisdom of Section 303(b) agreed with
him that it conferred federal jurisdiction without regard to diversity.20 Any
remaining doubts as to congressional intent should have been dissipated by
the incorporation into Section 303(b) of the limitations and provisions of
Section 301.2
Section 303(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act was clearly intended to supply a
federal remedy for injuries caused by secondary boycotts and jurisdictional
20. See note 2 supra.
21. "A federal statutory tort has been created. The Federal courts are given juris-
diction and it would be unnecessary to eliminate the usual [diversity] requirement"
Communication to the YALE LAW JouRxAL from Thomas E. Shroyer, Professional Staff
Member, Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, and Chief Counsel to the
Joint Committee on Labor Management Relations, Nov. 22, 1949 (replying for Senator
Taft). See also notes 23 and 24 infra.
22. 38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1946).
23. See 93 CONG. Rc. 4872 (1947). The original Senate proposal removed labor
unions from exemption under the antitrust laws if they conspired to fix prices, allocate
customers, or impose restrictions on the purchase, sale or use of materials in restraint
of trade. SE-. REP. No. 105, Supplemental Views, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 55 (1947). As
finally adopted, Section 303 stops short of declaring this activity a conspiracy, but the
intent remains to subject unions to restrictions and liabilities similar to those applied
against employers under the Sherman Act. Ibid.; 93 CoNG. Rm 4872 (1947). And the
jurisdictional requirements in Section 303(b) are parallel to those in the treble damage
clause of the Sherman Act-neither contains a jurisdictional minimum nor an express
disclaimer of diversity.
24. E.g., Rambusch Decorating Co. v. Brotherhood of Painters & Decorators &
Paperhangers of America, 105 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1939).
25. See notes 21 and 23 supra.
26. See, e.g., 93 CoNG. R.. 4868 (1947) (statement by Senator Pepper) : "In the
next place Mr. President [Section 303] confers jurisdiction on the Federal courts without
regard to diversity of citizenship required in other Federal cases." See also id. at 4345.
See id. at 4839, where Senator Morse stated: "In other words, the proposal of the
Senator from Ohio would open wide the doors of the federal courts to damage suits... '
27. See note 5 supra. The Schatte court interpreted the "limitations and provisions"
clause as applicable only to non-conflicting provisions in Section 303(b). 84 F. Supp.
669, 674. Having already decided that Congress intended to require diversity, the court
concluded that the clause did not apply here.
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strikes,28 and to open the federal courts to "whoever" should be injured by
those activities. The decision in the Schatte case reads into it a diversity re-
quirement which is not there. And since in most cases the parties to a Section
303(b) action will be residents of the same state," the decision virtually elim-
inates the federal forum.
28. See note 2 supra. For discussion indicating congressional concern over the lack
of federal remedies see, e.g., 93 CONG. REc. 4838-9 (1947); SEN. REP. No. 105, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1947).
29. The members of Congress were primarily concerned with providing remedies for
small business men and farmers injured by the proscribed activities. See 93 Coxa. RE.
4838 (1947); SEN. REP. No. 105, Supplemental Views, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 54 (1947).
In most of these instances, the parties will be residents and citizens of the same local area.
This is particularly true of jurisdictional strikes which generally involve local unions,
And the result is not changed if a national union is joined with the local since all ad-
verse parties must be diverse before the federal courts may take diversity jurisdiction,
Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 3 Cranch. 267 (U.S. 1806). Moreover, the scope of Section
303 (b) is broad enough to include some disputes between employees and their own em-
ployer. See note 4 supra. Here there will frequently be no diversity.
